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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
I. Introduction
Emboldened by spicy content available on television, in the
movies, and on compact dics, and enticed by the persistent, potent,
indelible and uncontainable form of the Internet,' secondary
students are experimenting with free speech in new ways. These
experiments raise challenges for adults charged with guiding the
students into responsible majority.2
This Article will review the existing legal limits on secondary
students' speech. Special attention will be paid to case law
addressing expressions over the Internet. The elements of proof
necessary to support secondary student discipline based on Internet
speech will be studied. Thereafter, this Article will intensely
examine a recent website/school expulsion case from Pennsylvania.
Finally, conclusions will be drawn about how courts are dealing
with Internet speech issues within the context of secondary schools.
II. Background
The United States Supreme Court reminds us of the
importance of protecting fundamental freedoms in schools:
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools. The
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.3
Among the freedoms protected in schools is freedom of
speech.4  Students do "not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
1. See Daniel Okrent, Raising Kids Online, What Can Parents Do?, TIME,
May 10, 1999 at 38.
2. See Is Your Kid Caught in the Web?, CONSUMER REPORTS, May, 1997, at
27-31; see also Children in Cyberspace: A Privacy Resource Guide for Parents,
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2l-children.htm
(last modified Apr. 2000).
3. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations and
quotations omitted).
4. See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, (1969).
5. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
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First Amendment protections for students, however, "are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
,,6settings. Instead, they must be "applied in light of the special
circumstances of the school environment."7  The Federal
Constitution does not compel "teachers, parents, and elected school
officials to surrender control of the American public school system
to public school students."" Thus, school officials may regulate
expression of opinions which "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school or collides with the rights of others."9 Similarly, it is
"perfectly appropriate" to impose sanctions "to make the point to
pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent
with the 'fundamental values' of public school education.""l
A. Disruptive Expression
The leading case on restriction of student expression is Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District." In that
case, a group of students and adults wore black armbands in a high
school to publicize their objections to hostilities in Vietnam.'2 The
students were suspended. 3 The United States Supreme Court
concluded the expression was protected, 4 and the suspensions were
reversed. 5 The Court stated:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able
to show that its action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly, where
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained. 
6
6. Fraser, 475 U.S. at 682.
7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
8. See Fraser, 475 U.S. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J.
dissenting)).
9. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (citing Burnsida v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966).
10. Fraser, 475 U.S. at 685-86.
11. See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. See id. at 504.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 509-511.
15. See id. at 514.
16. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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The Court therefore held that "conduct by a student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior-materially disrupts class work or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 7
Subsequent decisions of federal courts have given more
guidance. "It is clear the school authorities need not wait for a
potential harm to occur before taking protective action."' 9 Nor
must the school district be able to predict with certainty that a
"certain number of students in all grades would be harmed.""0
Rather, school officials "must demonstrate a substantial basis for
their conclusion" that expression "would result in significant harm
to some students. '2 ' This has been described as the reasonable
22forecast test.
Moreover, courts have recognized a "wide degree of
deference" in evaluating actions by school officials.' "'The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board,' and not with the federal courts.
24
The expression sanctioned as disruptive need not originate in
school. Thus, comments in underground newspapers created,
reproduced, and distributed off-campus may support student
discipline if the on-campus effect is materially disruptive."
17. Id. at 513.
18. See generally, Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation, What Oral Statement Of
Student Is Sufficiently Disruptive So As To Fall Beyond Protection Of The First
Amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED. 599.
19. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
20. Id. at 1051.
21. Id. at 1049.
22. See Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, 134 F.3d
821, 827 (7th Cir. 1998); Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.2d 524,
530 (9th Cir. 1992); Shanely v. Northeast Independent School District, 462 F.2d
960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. Seamons v. Snow, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1158 (D. Utah 1998) (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (198)). See also Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1051;
Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527.
24. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527.
25. Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517, 519 (1969)
("Oink" distributed to 450 students as they entered campus); Cf. Donovan v.
Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1995) ("THE SHIT LIST," secretly delivered to
school, crudely described 140 students, but material disruption was not discussed);
Thomas v. Board of Education of Granville Central School District, 607 F.2d 1043,
1052 n.17 (2nd Cir. 1979) ("Hard Times," a vulgar underground paper executed
and distributed outside school neither caused nor threatened material disruption).
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The recent case of Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School
District,26 involving an Internet site, is instructive. In Beussink, the
district court granted a high school student a preliminary injunction
against pending discipline from his school as a result of discovery of
his crude and vulgar criticism on an Internet homepage." The
school district could not demonstrate any reasonable fear or
projection of disruption as a result of the Internet homepage, and
there was no evidence that any other student was aware of the
homepage or accessed the homepage.28 Moreover, there was no
evidence that school resources were used to create the homepage or
that it was created at school.29 In summary, courts have held that
student speech in any location, from any source, in any form, that
causes material disruption in school is not constitutionally
protected, and may subject the student to discipline.
B. Threatening Expression
Obviously, schools may also control expressions which
threaten harm to school personnel or advocate violence against
school personnel "regardless of whether the conduct occurred on or
off-campus."30  Also, threats to school property originating off-
campus may be controlled by school discipline.3" However, courts
have different views on the test to be applied to determine whether
a student's statement is a threat.
In Bystrom v. Fridley High School,32 the suspension of several
high school students who distributed an unofficial newspaper on
school premises was upheld.3' The publication contained sexually
explicit, indecent, and lewd language. 4 In addition, the publication
advocated violence against teachers by a favorable reference to
26. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D.
Missouri 1998) (granting motion for preliminary injunction).
27. See id. at 1177.
28. See id. at 1177-78.
29. Compare id., with Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 (school resources were
incidentally used in creating a vulgar underground newspaper, but the involvement
of the school was minimal).
30. Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996).
Cf. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("fighting words"
directed to teacher at shopping center on Sunday).
31. See Boucher v. School Board of the School District of Greenfield, 134 F.3d
821, 824 (7th Cir. 1998) (threat to school computer network).
32. 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987).
33. Id. at 1393, 1396.
34. See id. at 1389-90, 1393.
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vandalism at a teacher's home. 5 The publication was not a call to
arms, nor was it likely to incite or produce imminent, lawless
action.36 The students' published expressions fell short of that
which could be redressed in adults;37 nevertheless, the district court
concluded that deference to school authorities with respect to their
decision to discipline the students for advocating violence against
their teachers was appropriate."
Another instructive case is Lovell v. Poway Unified School
District.3'9 In Lovell, a high school student was disciplined for
allegedly threatening to shoot a counselor in connection with a
proposed schedule change."0 A trial judge held that the student's
speech was protected," but the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.42
The Court set forth an objective test 3 to determine whether a
student's threat "falls outside the protection of the First
Amendment: 'whether a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to
harm or assault.' '' 44 The Court further noted "that alleged threats
should be considered in light of their entire factual context,
including the surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners.""
35. See id. at 1390. One article reported an incident of vandalism that had
occurred at a teacher's home. The article claimed "many students attending
Fridley would like to claim responsibility for this act, and I can't say that I blame
them." Id.
36. See Brystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1393.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
40. Id. at 368, 369 n.1.
41. See id. at 368, 370.
42. See id. at 370, 373.
43. In forming an objective test to determine whether the student's statement
was a "true threat," unprotected by the Constitution, the Court of Appeals relied
upon 9th Circuit decisions in analogous contexts for adults. See generally United
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990) (objective standard used
to determine that Defendant's statements about kicking victim's "fucking ass," and
boxing with him were threats to assault within meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
115(a)(1)(B)); United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1989) (mailings from
Defendant condemning victim's actions, accompanied by posters calling for a
revolution, and advocating lynch mobs, the shooting of black miscegenists and the
hanging of whites could be found to be a threat of force within meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 3631); United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1987) (objective
standard used to determine that Defendant's statements about killing President
Reagan were threats within meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 871).
44. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (quoting Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265).
45. Id. (quoting Orozco -Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265).
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Significantly, the Court considered violence in schools generally as
part of the entire factual context.4 6  "In light of the violence
prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in taking
very seriously student threats against faculty or other students," the
Court wrote.47
As in Lovell, courts have recently shown a willingness to
evaluate alleged student threats within the broader framework of
violence in secondary schools. Thus, in In the interest of B.R., a
minor," the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that a high
school student's statement that he would bring a gun to school
could be viewed as more than "mere idle juvenile chitchat. 49
In light of this tragic and stark reality of the potential danger of
gun related violence within our schools, a statement by a student
that he would bring a gun to school must be regarded seriously
as an attempt to create fear and apprehension of a future violent
act or, at the very least, a reckless disregard of the potential to
create such fear and apprehension. °
A recent case from the United States District Court, Western
District of Washington (Seattle) deserves mention. In Emmett v.
Kent School District No. 415,5" the district court granted a
temporary restraining order for discipline of a high school student
whose Internet web page included mock obituaries of two fellow
students. 2 In addition, the student author allowed visitors "to vote
on who would 'die' next-that is, who would be the subject of the
next mock obituary." 3  An evening television news story
characterized the website as featuring a "hit list." 4 The news story
spurred discipline.5
46. See id.
47. Id. (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals also stated, "given the level
of violence pervasive in public schools today, it is no wonder that [the counselor]
felt threatened." Id. at 373. However, the Court noted that while the effect on the
listener was one consideration, "the final result turns upon whether a reasonable
person in these circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would
have this effect." See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 392.
48. 732 A.2d 633 (1999).
49. See id. at 638.
50. Id. at 639 (emphasis in original).
51. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).






The website had been created at home without using school1 6
resources or time . In addition, the school district offered no
evidence that anyone felt threatened, that the author intended to
intimidate or threaten anyone,57 that the author did actually
threaten anyone or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever. 8
Noting the foregoing, the district court concluded that the student
had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and granted a
restraining order."
C. Offensive and Vulgar Expression
Schools may control expression that is so inappropriate in form
as to be inconsistent with the basic educational mission of schools.
The leading case in this area is Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser.' In Fraser, a high school student delivered a nomination
speech at an assembly in which the student referred to his candidate
in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.
61
The student was disciplined.62 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the discipline and concluded that the in-school speech was
not protected.63 Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court:
These fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility'
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when
the views expressed may be unpopular. But these 'fundamental
values' must also take into account consideration of the
sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the
sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse
in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal
sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.
56. See Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1090.
59. See id. Material disruption was not discussed. It is noteworthy that "at
least two" of the author's friends were the subject of the mock obituaries. Id. at
1089.
60. 478 U.S, 675.
61. Id. at 677-78.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 685.
64. Id. at 681.
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Thus, the Supreme .Court concluded that "it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use
of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse." 5 The Court did
not require proof of material disruption.'
Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.7 The Court upheld a high school principal's
decision to withhold a story on student pregnancy and a story on
the impact of divorce on students from publication in the school
newspaper.68 The Court focused on school-sponsored publications
and other expressions that might reasonably be perceived to bear
the imprimatur of the school.69 Educators are entitled to exercise
greater control over such expressions, the Court concluded.7 ' A
school may disassociate itself from speech that is, for example,
"biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences."7' School-sponsored speech may be limited
whether or not material disruption can be reasonably forecast, so
long as limitations "are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."
72
Under the holdings in Fraser and Hazelwood, students'
offensive expression in school, or vulgar student expression
identified with a school, may be redressed without forecasting
material disruption. The Supreme Court has not addressed
restrictions on students' profane comments about a school or its
staff which originate off-campus but which find their way to school.
Guidance in this area is found in the decisions of lower courts.73
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chandler v. McMinnville
School District4 addressed this issue. High school students had
been disciplined for wearing buttons and stickers referring to
"scabs" during a teachers' strike in which replacement teachers had
been hired.7 5 The Court found the passive expression of a political
65. See Bethel School District No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683.
66. See id. at 694 n.4 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
67. 484 U.S. 260.
68. See id. at 263-64.
69. See id. at 271.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See Hazelwood School Dist., 484 U.S. at 272-273.
73. See generally, Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Right To Discipline Pupil For
Conduct Away From School Grounds Or Not Immediately Connected With School
Activities, 53 A.L.R.3d, §§ 4, 10, 18 at 1133-34, 1140-42, 1147-48 (1973 ed. and 1999
supp.).
74. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 526.
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viewpoint protected in the absence of a forecast of disruption."
However, the Court observed that school officials may suppress
vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech in school,
without showing that it occurred at an official school program or
event or that it threatened to substantially interfere with the
school's work.7 Under this approach, vulgar and plainly offensive
expressions regarding school policies or staff on an Internet site
which has significant presence on-campus, could be the basis for
discipline.
Similarly, authority supports discipline imposed on students for
vulgar off-campus writings that have significant presence on campus
without a showing of disruption. In Donovan v. Ritchie,8 a high
school student sought to enjoin a school suspension related to a list
created at a student's home,79 which crudely commented on 140
fellow students.8 ' Reduction of penalty was conditioned on certain
steps "'to repair the damage' to individuals and the school.""1
Judgment for the school district was affirmed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Court rejected the student's argument that
the writing was neither abusive nor obscene. 2 By analogy, this
approach83 could also support discipline for a student's profane
website significantly accessed on campus. The significance of the
website's presence on campus will be a critical element of proof.'
76. See id. at 531.
77. See id. at 529 (dictum). See also Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789, 798
(S.D. Ind. 1996) (shouting crude "fighting words" in cafeteria line with ninety
students nearby was clearly disruptive and not protected speech).
78. 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
79. Id. at 16.
80. "THE SHIT LIST" included sixty characterizations "that were not merely
insulting as to appearance, but suggestive, often explicitly so, of sexual capacity,
proclivity, and promiscuity." Id. at 16.
81. Id. Although disruption was not specifically discussed, the number of
students specifically named and the reference to "damage" suggests that there was
no contest on this point. See id.
82. Donovan, 68 F.3d at 18.
83. See Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973)
(underground newspaper containing coarse language distributed near campus
entrance, little or no disruption). See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
84. See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78
(1998), in which a highly critical and vulgar website was created at a student's
home. The website was accessed by school administrators twice prior to discipline,
without any evidence of student disturbance. Id. at 1177-78. The district court
enjoined the discipline. Id. See also Thomas, 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979)
(use of typewriter and secret storing of copies of underground newspaper in
teacher's locker were de minimus connection with school).
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III. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District
A recent decision by a state appellate court in Pennsylvania
affords the opportunity for a case study. In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District,"5 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court addressed
constitutional issues arising for the expulsion of the eighth grade
author of a website titled "Teacher Sux."
A. Facts
The student created the website on his home computer on his
own time during early 1998."6 "Teacher Sux" contained several web
pages that made derogatory comments about the student's algebra
teacher and the school principal.87 As to the algebra teacher, the
language was crude8 and repetitive.8 9 Another web page displayed
a diagram of the teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping
from her neck.' After asking "Why Should She Die?", the author
stated "(Take a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then
give me $20.00 to help pay for the hitman.)."9'
Regarding the school principal, another section of the website
bore the greeting "Welcome to Kartsotis Sux! ' '92 In response to the
posted question "Why Does Kartsotis Suck?", the author answered
in part that the principal was engaged in an unchaste relationship
with a female principal of another school in the school district.93
The website was not "password protected" and could be
accessed from other sites. ' A "disclaimer" appeared on the first
page of the website.95 In the "disclaimer" the author requested
agreement that the visitor was not a member of school faculty or
administration and that the visitor did not intend to disclose the
identity of the author or intend to cause trouble for the author.96
85. 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. 2000).
86. Id. at 415.
87. Id.
88. Id. "She shows off her fat ... [t]hat fat fuck smokes. She's a bitch." Id. at
416.
89. J.S., 757 A.2d at 416. "'Fuck you Mrs. Fulmer. You are a Bitch. You are




93. J.S., 757 A.2d at 416. "He sees Mrs. Derrico (Asa Packer principal). He
sees Mrs. Derrico naked. He fucks Mrs. Derrico." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 415.
96. Id.; see also J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 51 Northampton County
Rep. 181, 182 (Northampton County 1999) (available at http://www.nccpa.org/,
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The algebra teacher was frightened by the website. 97 She
suffered from "stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of
weight, and a general sense of lost well-being."98  Her lifestyle
changed, she suffered headaches, took prescription medication, and
was unable to return to school for the remainder of the school
year.' Further, she applied for a medical sabbatical for the next
school year.100
The website had a demoralizing impact on the school
community. 1 The effect on the staff was described as comparable
to the effect from the death of a student or staff member, with "a
feeling of helplessness and a plummeting morale.""' Also,
disruption resulted from the use of substitute teachers to replace
the algebra teacher for the last month of the school year.' 3
B. Trial Court
After hearings, the student was permanently expelled. 4 He
and his parents appealed to the county court.0 5  Among other
things, they contended that: 1) the expulsion infringed the student's
off-campus freedom of speech, 6 2) the website content did not
constitute a true threat to the algebra teacher, 7 3) the expulsion
infringed the student's equal protection rights,"° 4) the School
District erred when it failed to exculpate the student on the basis of
the website disclaimer;" 9 and 5) the School District invaded the
student's privacy by viewing the website." °
search for "1998-CE-7696").
97. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 416.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 416-17.
101. Id. at 417.
102. J.S., 757 A.2d at 417.
103. See id.
104. See id. 415, 417.
105. See J.S., 51 Pa. C. 181-82 (Northampton 1999) In addition, the student and
his parents sued the Bethlehem Area School District, its superintendent and the
school principal for damages resulting from the alleged abridgment of the student's
civil rights. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., No. 1998-CE-5770
(Northampton County Ct. Com. Pl. 1999), http://www.nccpa.org/, search for "1998-
CE-5770.".
106. See J.S., 51 Pa. C. at 184, 192.
107. See id. at 192.
108. See id. at 191.
109. Seeid. at 192.
110. See id. at 193.
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The trial court affirmed the permanent expulsion of the
student."' The court concluded that the School District did not
impermissibly interfere with the student's freedom of expression
because the expression was not protected speech. ' 2  The court
explained that the expression was not protected because it was
materially disruptive, and it advocated violence against school
staff."3
"The expression sanctioned as disruptive need not originate in
school," wrote the court.'"4 Noting that the home-made website was
accessed at school, during normal school hours, with school
equipment,"5 and that disruption occurred at school," 6 the trial
court rejected the "off-campus" defense raised by the student and
his family."7
On the "true threat" issue, the trial court exercised deference
to the judgment of those entrusted with the daily activities of public
education with respect to their decision to discipline students for
advocating violence against teachers.. 8  "Whether or not these
expressions could be redressed outside the public education
context, and whether or not they were likely to incite an immediate
mutiny, the expressions were clearly of such a nature as to invite
the concerned attention of the School District and its employees,"
the trial court stated." 9
The trial court also rejected claims that the student's equal
protection rights were violated.' On this issue, the court adopted a
rational relation test.'2' The trial court concluded that the School
District had a "legitimate interest in preserving an appropriate
learning environment, free from material disruption and fear of
violence.' 2  The court further concluded that the discipline was
rationally related to that governmental interest.'23
Because the website disclaimer did not limit a visitor's access
to the entire site contents, the trial court concluded that there was
111. J.S., 51 Pa. C. at 195.
112. See id. at 185.
113. See id. at 185-88.
114. Id. at 186.
115. Seeid. at 192.
116. See J.S., 51 Pa. C. at 186-89.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 188.
119. Id. at 187-88.
120. See id. at 191.





no factual basis for it to exonerate the student.12 1 Moreover, the
disclaimer was not effective as a warning, because "it did not advise
users of the violent or offensive aspects of the website.' 25 Further,
"the disclaimer [could] not be the basis for an assumption of the
risk defense," because such a defense is not available for intentional
acts. "'26
Regarding invasion of privacy, the trial court concluded that
"the author of an open-access website enjoys no reasonable
expectation of privacy,' ' 27 and the author assumes the risk that he
will be deceived as to the identity of a visitor.'28 Thus, the trial court
rejected the invasion of privacy claims.29
C. Commonwealth Court
Appeal was taken by the student and his parents to the
Commonwealth Court raising the same arguments.'30 A divided
panel of the court affirmed.'
The Commonwealth Court concluded that speech occurring off
of school premises and communicated to others via the Internet
could be the basis for discipline. '32 After reviewing Donovan v.
Ritchie,33 Fenton v. Stear,' and Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School
District,33 the Court stated "it is evident that the courts have
allowed school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring
off of school premises where it is established that the conduct
materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process.', 36 This conclusion, from which no apparent disagreement
arose, 137 represents the first appellate court decision to permit
school discipline on the basis (of a website created at home.
124. See id. at 192.
125. Id.
126. J.S., 51 Pa. C. at 192.
127. Id. at 193.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 417 (Pa. Commw.
2000).
131. See id. at 425.
132. Seeid. at 418-21.
133. 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
134. 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
135. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
136. J.S., 757 A.2d at 421.
137. Id. The dissent raised only the issues of material disruption and definition
of threat. See id- at 426-29.
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The panel majority concluded that the evidence supported a
finding that the website hindered the educational process."'
Specifically, the algebra teacher's physical and emotional
suffering'39 and the website's negative effect on other students'
perception of the teacher and principal were cited by the Court.'
4
11
"The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and
conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.' 41  The
majority placed emphasis on the student's notorious disdain for
school officials142 and the student's disrespectful statements
regarding the algebra teacher 4 3 in concluding that "[i]t is not
socially acceptable to threaten and harass those that are charged
with educating our youth."'"
The holding of the Commonwealth Court references the
United States' Supreme Court decision in Fraser, and seems to
adopt the theme that offensive expression in school, or vulgar
student expression identified with a school, may be redressed so
long as the limitations "are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.' 14' The Commonwealth Court has surpassed
the holding in Fraser, however, by applying the rationale to speech
originating away from school or a school-sponsored event. On this
issue, the approach of the Commonwealth Court coincides with
dictum in Chandler that "school officials may suppress speech that
is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive without a showing that
such speech occurred during a school-sponsored event or
threatened to 'substantially interfere with [the school's] work."
4 6
To this extent, the Commonwealth Court's decision in J.S.
represents a new statement of dispositive law.
138. See id. at 421. The dissent, conceding that the content of the website
effected the teacher, disputed whether there was material disruption of classwork
or substantial disorder. See id. at 426, n.1.
139. See id. at 421.
140. SeeJ.S.,757A.2dat421.
141. Id. at 422 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
142. See id. at 424.
143. See id. at 421.
144. Id. at 424.
145. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
146. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th




The Commonwealth Court judges disagreed on whether the
student's website expressions constituted a threat to the algebra
teacher. The majority concluded that a reasonable person could be
both physically and emotionally disturbed after viewing a website
that contained a picture of her severed head dripping with blood, a
picture of her face morphing into Adolph Hitler's, and a
solicitation, whether serious or otherwise, for funds to cover the
cost of a hitman"' The majority wrote: "Regrettably, in this day
and age where school violence is becoming more commonplace,
school officials are justified in taking very seriously threats against
faculty and other students. We emphatically reject Appellants'
attempt to dismiss the reactions of the targeted faculty members as
merely subjective.' ' 48 The explicit recognition of school violence as
a circumstance to be considered in evaluating a threat is consistent
with other recent decisions.
149
The dissent urged adoption of the objective test used in
Lovell15" to determine whether a student's statement was a "true
threat."'5 The dissent stated the test to be "whether a reasonable
person in the student's position would foresee that viewers of the
website would interpret it as a serious expression of intent to
harm."'52 Concluding that a reasonable eighth grader would not
necessarily foresee that the website, with its disclaimer, would be
interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm, the dissent
urged reversal.'53
The disagreement between the Commonwealth Court judges
reflects the lack of unanimity among courts nationwide. Many
courts adopt an approach that defers to the decision of school
authorities once there is a showing of a potential threat.14 The 9th
Circuit has adopted an objective test, considering the statement in
147. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 421.
148. Id. at 422.
149. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996); In
the interest of B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 638-39 (1999).
150. 90 F.3d at 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
151. J.S., 757 A.2d at 426 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Friedman, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 428 (Friedman, J., dissenting). ("In cases such as this, we must
strike a delicate balance between recognition of the dangers that, unfortunately,
exist in our schools today and the reality that children, no matter how
sophisticated their knowledge may be, are nevertheless children, immature and
naive.") Id.
154. See, e.g., Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Minn.
1987).
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the light of all circumstances, including the violence prevalent in
schools today.'
Without dissent on the issue, the Commonwealth Court
rejected the claims that the student's equal protection rights were
violated. The Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that all persons under all
circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law. The state
may classify individuals for the purpose of receiving different
treatment and need not provide equal treatment among those with
differing needs.' In order to prohibit speech that is lewd, obscene,
profane, libelous and insulting, there must be a rational basis for
prohibiting it.' 8 The Court concluded that the website expressions
did not constitute constitutionally protected speech, and it applied
the rational basis test.9
The Court concluded that "schools must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized society and the conduct that is
appr 6 priate thereto. It is not socially acceptable to threaten or
harass those that are charged with educating our youth. The School
District's policy advances this standard of conduct."'"
The disclaimer at the beginning of the student's website
afforded him no protection from access by school authorities and
punishment, the majority of the Commonwealth Court concluded.1
6'
"The disclaimer does not create a contract between Student and the
viewer and does not create any rights thereunder that could be
renounced.'62 The Court also noted that the disclaimer did not
limit access to the site and did not inform the viewer of its offensive
nature.'
63
In a decision of first impression, the Commonwealth Court
held that the School District did not violate the student's privacy
when it accessed his website.'9 On this issue, the Court emphasized
that the student's website "was not a protected site, meaning that
155. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372.
156. J.S., 757 A.2d at 423 (citing Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 424.
159. Id.
160. Id. This reasoning is consistent with the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals'
position in Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529.
161. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 425. However, the dissenting judge suggested that,
given the disclaimer, the student did not expect that school officials would access
the website. See id. at 428, n.5.





only certain viewers could access the site by use of a known
password.',
161
The Court relied on a recent federal criminal prosecution
involving transmission of child pornography over the Internet, U.S.
v. Charbonneau 66 The defendant challenged the seizure of his e-
mail and chat room transmissions from America Online (AOL).
The district court analogized the defendant to the author of a letter,
whose control over the message is reduced when it is mailed, and
whose control over the message ceases when it is received and
opened.'17 As the author's control diminishes and ceases, so does
his expectation of privacy. 168 "Messages sent to the public at large
in the 'chatroom' or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent lose any semblance of privacy.' 16' The district court
held that because the defendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the seizure of defendant's AOL
transmissions were not protected by the Fourth Amendment.7 '
The Commonwealth Court accepted the e-mail/chat room
ruling in Charbonneau, and extended it to the student's website.'7'
The creator of a website controls the site until such time as it is
posted on the Internet.'72 After it is posted, the creator loses
control of the website, allowing it to be accessed by anyone."'




Language in a student website created at school or at home is
not protected if it causes material disruption at school or if material
disruption at school can be reasonably forecast.'75 Deference is
165. J.S., 757 A.2d at 425.
166. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
167. Id. at 1184 (citing U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 1185 (citing Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 419).
170. Id.




175. See id. Cf Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 512-13. Cf Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (creating website off-campus, which does not materially
disrupt school, cannot support discipline).
[Vol. 105:2
LIMITS ON STUDENTS' SPEECH
given to a school district in determining whether material
disruption has occurred.'76
B. Threatening Expression
In addition, language in a student website created at school or
at home is not protected if it advocates violence against others,'77
threatens others,'76 or contains "fighting words" likely to provoke
school-related confrontation.79 When considering what constitutes
a true threat, a school district's conclusion may be given
deference.'9 Alternatively, a student's alleged threat may be
evaluated under an objective standard, in light of its entire factual
context, including the violence prevalent in schools today.''
A student "hit list" frequently contains a list of names of
students or school staff together with some additional language
which may constitute a threat."'2 A recent tragedy at Columbine
High School in Littleton, Colorado sparked a string of copycat
incidents, involving numerous "hit lists.' '8 3 In the Columbine High
School case, the perpetrator had written a threat on his website to
kill a specific classmate and others: "I don't care if I live or die in
the shootout, all I want to do is kill and injure as many of you pricks
as I can.""'4 Shortly thereafter in Bakersfield, California, a thirteen
year old boy with a handgun and ammunition was found in school




176. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, 685); see
Seamons, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139, 151-52
(1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Edu., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968)); see J.S., 757 A.2d at 417
(citing Commonwealth. v. Hall, 455 A.2d 674 (1983).
177. See Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1393.
178. J.S., 757 A.2d at 423.
179. See Heller, 928 F. Supp. at 798. Cf Fenton, 423 F. Supp. at 769 (calling a
teacher a "prick" at shopping center). But cf. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440,
1442 (D. Me. 1986) (discipline disallowed where student extended middle finger at
teacher in front of restaurant).
180. Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1391.
181. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372; J.S., 757 A.2d at 428 (citing Lovell, 90 F.3d at
372).
182. See Christine Schiavo & Christian D. Berg, Northampton Schools Closed
After Graffiti 'Hit List' Found, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, PA), April 30,
1999, at B01.
183. See Kenneth J. Cooper, This Time, Copycat Wave Is Broader; Schools
Scramble to Respond to Violent Threats Since Littleton, THE WASH. POST, May 1,
1999, at A06.
184. T. Trent Gregax & Matt Bai, Searching for Answers, NEWSWEEK, May 10,
1999, at 33.
185. See Tammerlin Drummond, Battling the Columbine Copycats, TIME, May
10, 1999, at 29.
2001]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:2
There is little ambiguity in the threats referenced above or in
threats to blow up a school. 8 6  However, some threats are less
direct. A favorable reference to vandalism at a teacher's house
could be a threat,'87 as could a picture of a teacher's decapitated
head.'" Students may argue that there was no present intent to
injure ' or that the writing was a joke.'" These arguments have
found few fans among school administrators,'9 ' but have met with
some success in federal court."
C. Offensive and Vulgar Expression
Vulgar and plainly offensive non-political expression in a
student website created at home or at school is not protected if it is
accessed significantly at school, regardless of proof of material
disruption.' 3 The significance of the website's presence on campus
will be a critical element of proof.94 Courts have considered
numbers of hits'95 and the number of students referenced in the
website.9 6 This speech is not protected because it is inconsistent
with the basic educational mission of public schools to teach by
example the shared values of a civilized social order. 97
186. See John T. McQuiston, Terror in Littleton: The Echoes; Wave of Copycat
Threats Leads to Swift Responses Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at A15.
187. See Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (1987).
188. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Commw.
2000).
189. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (2000); In the
interest of B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 639 (1999). See also Diane Marczely Gimpel, Judge
Upholds Suspension of Strayer Pupil Over Hit List; Court Has Yet to Rule on
Whether Boy's Right to Due Process Was Violtated, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL,
May 13, 1999, at B04.
190. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 416.
191. See Bystrom, 686 F. Supp. at 1390; J.S., 757 A.2d at 415-16. In the Interest
of B.R., 732 A.2d at 638-39.
192. See Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (holding that a student who authored
web page showing mock obituaries of two fellow students and allowing visitors to
vote on who would "die" next and be the subject of the next mock obituary did not
actually threaten anyone).
193. See Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995); Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1973); Chandler v. McMinnville
Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992); J.S., 757 A.2d at 423-24.
194. See Beussink v. Woodland A-IV Sch. Dist, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D.
Mo. 1998); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
195. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 421 n. 11 (234 hits).
196. Compare Donovan, 68 F.3d at 15 (naming 140 students) and Emmett, 92
F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (naming two students).
197. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); J.S., 757 A.2d at
423-24.
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D. Equal Protection
Discipline of students based on disruptive, threatening or
offensive Internet speech is not a violation of equal protection
guarantees.9 8 Student speech which "materially and substantially
interfer[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of
others" is not constitutionally protected."9 In order to prohibit such
speech, there must be a rational basis for prohibiting it."'
A school district's policy against harassment of students and
teachers alike serves the legitimate purpose of ensuring safe schools
that promote a learning environment.0 ' Further, school officials
may suppress speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene or plainly
offensive because "such language may well 'impinge upon the rights
of other students,' and therefore its suppression is 'reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'2 2
E. Disclaimers
Many websites provide user agreements, subscriber
agreements and disclaimers, some as a condition precedent to
access.23 User agreements and disclaimers usually seek to limit the
198. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529; J.S., 757 A.2d at 419.
199. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. See also J.S., 757 A.2d at 419.
200. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 424.
201. See id.
202. Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529.
203. For example, Amazon.com's Disclaimer provides in pertinent part:
DISCLAIMER
THIS SITE IS PROVIDED BY AMAZON.COM ON AN "AS IS"...
BASIS. AMAZON.COM MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO
THE OPERATION OF THE SITE, OR THE INFORMATION, CON-
TENT, MATERIALS, OR PRODUCTS INCLUDED ON THIS SITE.
TO THE FULL EXTENT PERMISSIBLE BY APPLICABLE LAW,
AMAZON.COM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. AMAZON.COM WILL NOT BE
LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND ARISING FROM
THE USE OF THIS SITE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL PUNITIVE AND CONSE-
QUENTIAL DAMAGES.
Amazon.com conditions of use at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/misc/
copyright.html/104-8780628-3967964 (visited 8/2/00).
Also, Yahoo posts the following relevant sections of its General Disclaimer:
Yahoo! Inc. does not represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of
any of the information, content or advertisements (collectively, the
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liability of the website owner or operator. 4 A student website, for
example, might request agreement not to discipline the author, or
not to notify school officials, as a precondition of use.2°5 It is
questionable whether disclaimers or user agreements will insulate
students from discipline for website content.
A student website disclaimer will not protect the creator from
access by school officials or from discipline, because it creates no
"Materials") contained on, distributed through, or linked, downloaded or
accessed from any of the services contained on this website (the
"Service"), nor the quality of any products, information or other
materials displayed, purchased, or obtained by you as a result of an
advertisement or any other information or offer in or in connection with
the Service (the "Products"). You hereby acknowledge that any reliance
upon any Materials shall be at your sole risk. Yahoo! reserves the right,
in its sole discretion and without any obligation, to make improvements
to, or correct any error or omissions in any portion of the Service or the
Materials.
THE SERVICE AND THE MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED BY
YAHOO! ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, AND YAHOO! EXPRESSLY
DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVICE OR ANY
MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS. IN NO EVENT SHALL YAHOO!
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND
WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVICE, THE
MATERIALS AND THE PRODUCTS.
Yahoo! Disclaimer at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/misc/disclaimer.html (visited
8/2/00). A similar disclaimer of accuracy of information, of warranties of
merchantability, of warranties for a particular purpose, and an assumption of the
risk of use is employed by The New York Times on the web at
http://www.nytimes.com/ subscribe/help/agree.html (visited 8/2/00).
204. Generally, disclaimers of accuracy of information, warranties of merchant-
ability and warranties of fitness for a particular purpose are intended as defenses
to claims for breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-313, § 2-314, § 2-315, § 2-316. A
disclaimer of accuracy of information also may be a defense to a claim for fraud.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1977); Lagen v. BalcorCo., 653
N.E.2d 968 (I1. App. 1995) (claiming negligent misrepresentation); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); Swolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d
959, (9th Cir. 1993) (assumption of risk is a defense to claims for negligence or
recklessness and for breach of warranty). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 496A (1965); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Products Liability: Contributory
Negligence or Assumption of Risk as a Defense in Action for Strict Liability or
Breach of Warranty Based on Failure to Provide Safety Device for Product
Causing Injury, 75 A.L.R. 4th 538.
205. See Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (warning visitors that website was not
sponsored by the school, and for entertainment purposes only); J.S., 757 A.2d at
425 (disclaimer requested agreement that the visitor was not a member of school
faculty or administration and that the visitor did not intend to disclose the author's
identity or cause trouble for him).
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rights.2  It does not create a contract."' In addition, a disclaimer
does not act as a warning where the website's violent or offensive
nature is not disclosed."" However, a disclaimer may evince the
author's expectation that school officials will not access the
website.2'
Moreover, agreements may be unenforceable on the grounds
of public policy.211  If the interest in enforcement is clearly
outweighed by a public policy against enforcement, the agreement
may not be enforced .
Within the context of a student's website containing disruptive,
threatening or offensive criticism of school policy or personnel, the
student's expectation in enforcement of an exculpatory user
agreement 2 2 would be balanced against the public policy in
preserving an appropriate learning environment.2"3 Public policy
favoring an appropriate learning environment has been recognized
206. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 418.
207. See id.
208. See id. See also J.S., 51 Pa. C. 181, 192 (Northampton 1999).
209. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 419 n.5 (dissenting opinion).
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178 (1981). Section 178
provides:
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or
the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken
of
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular
term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is
taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that
policy.
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the
term.
211. See id. § 178(1).
212. See id. § 178(2).
213. See id. § 178(3); Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986). Moreover, if the
website contained defamatory comments about school staff or other students, an
exculpatory user agreement would likely be unenforceable as a promise to induce




repeatedly by the courts . In recognition of prior judicial support,
courts may conclude that the public policy in favor of maintaining
an appropriate school environment clearly outweighs the student's
expectation of protection.
F. Privacy
A student threatened with discipline may claim a privacy right
in his or her Internet speech. Whether a student has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in Internet speech may depend upon the
form of Internet communication.
The creator of a website posted on the Internet without
password protection or other security has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.2 Further, the student author of threatening
or disruptive messages transmitted through e-mail or chat rooms
will have a diminishing expectation of privacy, ending upon the
receipt and subsequent forwarding of his messages by the receiving
party. 16
The education of our children is both enhanced and
complicated by the Internet. Parents and educators struggle to
draw a balance between new, immediate and pervasive expression
and traditional values of safety, respect, and an appropriate
environment for learning. Although the medium is new, the lesson
is ancient: in the Internet Age, we still need to consider how we
treat others.
214. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272; J.S., 757 A.2d at
418.
215. See J.S., 757 A.2d at 425.
216. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184-85, J.S, 757 A.2d at 418.
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